In elections, a set of candidates ranked consecutively (though possibly in different order) by all voters is called a clone set, and its members are called clones. A clone structure is the family of all clone sets of a given election. In this paper we study properties of clone structures. In particular, we give an axiomatic characterization of clone structures, show that they are organized hierarchically, and analyze clone structures in single-peaked and single-crossing elections. We describe a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a minimal collection of clones that need to be collapsed for an election to become single-peaked, and we show that this problem is NP-hard for single-crossing elections.
INTRODUCTION
Group decision making plays an important role in the proper functioning of human societies and multiagent systems. Collective decisions are often made by aggregating the preferences of individual agents by means of voting: each agent ranks the available alternatives, and a voting rule is used to select one or more winners (see [Arrow et al. 2002] for a general overview of voting, and [Faliszewski et al. 2010 ] for a more algorithmic perspective). In general, the structure of the set of alternatives may be quite complex. For instance, Ephrati and Rosenschein [1997] explore the situation where multiple agents try to coordinate their actions in order to devise a global plan. There the space of alternatives, i.e., of possible plans, may be huge, with some alternatives being very similar to each other. In such a case it may be reasonable to establish which plans differ fundamentally, and which are viewed as minor variations of each other.
Such structured decision-making environments have been studied in the social choice literature: for instance, Laffond et al. [1996] describe the situation when a group of agents has to choose from a set that is partitioned into several "projects," where each project is defined as a set of possible variants. In this setting, all agents are likely to rank the variants of each projects contiguously. This model was further investigated by Laslier [1996; 2000] . Tideman [1987] suggests a different explanation of why several alternatives in an election may be very similar to each other: a malicious party may try to "duplicate" an existing candidate in order to change the voting outcome. This procedure is known as cloning and the alternatives that appear together in all preference orders (though not necessarily in the same order) are called clones. Elkind et al. [2011] study algorithms for cloning and show that optimal cloning is easy for many voting rules.
Both when clones arise naturally and when they are created by a manipulator, it may be useful to understand the internal structure of the resulting clone sets. Indeed, such an understanding could be instrumental in uncovering hidden properties of voters' preferences such as, for example, a hierarchical structure of the alternative set, or the fact that after collapsing a small number of clones the election becomes single-peaked or single-crossing (informally, both single-peaked [Black 1958] and single-crossing [Mirrlees 1971 ] elections model societies focused on a single issue, such as, e.g., taxation level). In either case we could run the election in a better way by using a more suitable voting rule: in the former case we can use hierarchical voting, and in the latter case we can use the median voter rule-which is known to be strategy-proof for single-peaked and single-crossing profiles-to select a group of clones, and then pick the final winner from this group.
Perhaps more importantly, discovering a hidden single-peaked/single-crossing structure of preferences provides valuable information for agents participating in the election. For example, if the voters are ranking products of some sort (e.g., cellphone plans), and the preferences can become, say, single-peaked after decloning some clone sets, then those clone sets correspond to products that the customers view as, in some sense, equivalent. Such knowledge is important for the sellers of these products: for instance, if company A knows that its plan X is perceived as a clone of plans Y and Z of company B, it can create a more efficient advertising campaign by highlighting the features of plan X that positively distinguish it from Y and Z. From a more global perspective, the single-peakedness structure itself may reveal important properties of the market, helping to identify the features of the products that matter to the customers.
Our goal in this paper is to provide a formal understanding of what families of clone sets-which we call clone structures-can arise in elections (we give an axiomatic characterization), to provide convenient means of representing them (we show that PQtrees of Booth and Lueker [1976] very conveniently describe clone structures), and to find polynomial-time algorithms that restore single-peakedness/single-crossingness in elections by collapsing a minimal number of clones (we succeed for the case of singlepeakedness and prove NP-hardness for the case of single-crossing). Our work should be considered a preliminary, theoretical investigation of the subject of clone structures. In particular, we focus on an ideal situation where if some candidates are clones of each other, then indeed all voters view them as clones. For practical applications, one should seek results for "approximate" clone structures. Nonetheless, we believe that our results are useful for understanding the impact of clones in decision-making scenarios, will help in developing algorithms for settings where some of the candidates may be very similar to each other, and will provide a starting point for the study of approximate clone structures.
Due to space limit, many proofs, as well as some discussions, have been omitted.
PRELIMINARIES
Given a finite set C of candidates (or alternatives), a preference order (or ranking) over C is a total order over C, i.e., a complete, transitive and antisymmetric relation on C.
Intuitively, a preference order is a ranking of the candidates from the most desirable one to the least desirable one. By ← − we denote an order obtained by reversing order , that is, j ← − i if and only if i j. For two disjoint sets X, Y ⊆ C and an order , we write X Y if x y for all x ∈ X and all y ∈ Y . Given two sets X, Y ⊆ C, we say that X is a proper subset of Y if X ⊆ Y and 1 < |X| < |Y |. We say that X and Y intersect non-trivially and write
A preference profile R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ) on C is a collection of n preference orders over C, where order R i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, represents the preferences of the i-th voter; for readability, we sometimes write i in place of R i . An election over C is a pair E = (C, R), where R is a preference profile over C. A voting rule is a mapping T that, given an election E over C, outputs a set T (E) ⊆ C; the elements of T (E) are called the election winners. Many voting rules are used in practice and studied theoretically; see [Arrow et al. 2002] . However, since we focus on the nature of preference profiles, our results do not depend on the choice of a voting rule.
The following definition, inspired by [Tideman 1987] , is fundamental for our work.
Definition 2.2. Let R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ) be a preference profile over a candidate set C. We say that a non-empty subset X ⊆ C is a clone set for R if for every c, c ∈ X, every a ∈ C \ X, and every i = 1, 2, . . . , n it holds that c i a if and only if c i a.
Unlike Tideman [1987] , we define singletons to be clone sets; in the election from Example 2.1 each of {a}, {b}, {c}, {d}, {d, c}, {b, c, d}, and {a, b, c, d} is a clone set.
AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATION OF CLONE STRUCTURES
Our first goal is to understand which set families can be obtained as clone structures. That is, given a collection C of subsets of a candidate set C, we would like to determine if there exists a preference profile R over C such that each clone in R appears in our collection and vice versa; we will say that such R implements C. The main technical results of this section are (a) an axiomatic characterization of implementable families of subsets, and (b) a polynomial-time algorithm for recognizing such families.
In this section, we will consider elections over the set [m] = {1, . . . , m}. We will write [j, k] to denote {j, j + 1, . . . , k} for j, k ∈ [m].
Definition 3.1. Given a profile R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ) over [m], let C(R) ⊆ 2 [m] be the collection of all clone sets for R. We say that a family C ⊆ 2 [m] is a clone structure on [m] if it is equal to C(R) for some profile R on [m]. We remark that clone structures are very close in spirit to clans in 2-structures [Ehrenfeucht et al. 1999] , and many results in this section resemble those for clans [Möhring 1985 ]. We will, however, present a direct argument rather than translate these prior results, both because we need intermediate results for the analysis of single-peaked elections and because such a translation is non-trivial and would obscure useful intuition. Figure 1 (a)). Let R be a cyclic profile on [m], i.e., R = (R 1 , . . . , R m ), and the preferences of the i-th voter are given by R i :
We call the first clone structure from Example 3.2 a string of sausages and the second one a fat sausage. Note that any clone structure over [m] consists of at most m(m+1) 2 sets, since each clone set can be described by its location (i.e., beginning and end) in the preference ordering of a fixed voter. Thus, a string of sausages and a fat sausage can be thought of as, respectively, the maximal and the minimal clone structure over [m] . Let us now establish some basic properties of clone structures.
Proposition 3.3 does not give sufficient conditions for a family of subsets of [m] to be a clone structure. For example, P = 2 [m] \ {∅}, where m ≥ 3, satisfies all the conditions of Proposition 3.3. Yet, the cardinality of P is 2 m − 1, whereas each clone structure over [m] has at most m(m+1) 2 elements. The next proposition provides a further necessary condition for a family of subsets of [m] to be a clone structure. It is strong enough to exclude the collection 2 [m] \ {∅} for m > 3.
Given a profile R over [m] and a set X ∈ C(R), we say that a set Z ∈ Note, however, that for m = 3 the set family 2 [m] \ {∅} satisfies the conclusion of Proposition 3.4. Yet, it is obviously not a clone structure, since it contains a "cycle" {1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 1}. More generally, consider a set family over [m] that can be obtained from a string of sausages by adding the "missing link", i.e., the set {m, 1} as well as all of its supersets that are necessary to satisfy the conclusions of Proposition 3.3; we will call this set family a ring of sausages. Clearly, a ring of sausages is not a clone structure, because it cannot be implemented by an acyclic preference relation; yet, the conclusion of Proposition 3.4 is satisfied. Thus, we need to forbid rings of sausages; in fact, we require a somewhat more general condition. Definition 3.5. We say that a set family {A 0 , . . . , A k−1 } is a bicycle chain if k ≥ 3 and for all i = 0, . . . , k − 1 it holds that (1) 
, where all indices are computed modulo k. PROPOSITION 3.6. If C is a clone structure, it does not contain a bicycle chain. Propositions 3.3, 3.4 and 3.6 suggest the following set of axioms (note that these axioms are not normative; they simply tell us what clone structures are and not what they should be). Below, F is a set of candidates and F is a family of subsets of F . A1. {f } ∈ F for any f ∈ F , ∅ / ∈ F, and F ∈ F. A2. if C 1 and C 2 are in F and C 1 ∩ C 2 = ∅, then C 1 ∪ C 2 and C 1 ∩ C 2 are in F. A3. If C 1 and C 2 are in F and C 1 C 2 , then C 1 \ C 2 and C 2 \ C 1 are in F. A4. Each C ∈ F has at most two proper minimal supersets in F. A5. F does not contain a bicycle chain. Our next goal is to show that these five axioms indeed characterize clone structures. Axioms A1-A3 and axioms A4-A5 play different roles in our characterization result: the former ones ensure sufficient richness of a given set family, while the latter ones prevent it from being "too rich."
We will first build up the necessary tools for our inductive argument. Let E and F be two families of subsets on two disjoint finite sets E and F , respectively. We can embed F into E as follows. Given e ∈ E, let E(e → F) denote the family of subsets E ∪ F ⊆ 2 (E\{e})∪F , where E is obtained from E by replacing each set X containing e with (X \ {e}) ∪ F . , {x}, {y}, {x, y}, {c}, {a, x, y}, {x, y, c}, {a, x, y, c}}. It is easy to check that this, again, is a clone structure. If E and F satisfy axioms A1-A5 then so does E(e → F). PROPOSITION 3.8 . Let E and F be families of subsets on disjoint sets E and F , respectively, that satisfy A1-A5. Then for any e ∈ E the set family E(e → F) also satisfies A1-A5.
Next, we define an inverse operation to embedding, which we call collapsing. Observe that when we embed F ⊆ 2 F into E ⊆ 2 E , any C ∈ E(e → F) is either a subset of F , a superset of F , or does not intersect F at all. Thus, for a set family C on A to be collapsible, it should contain a set A that does not intersect non-trivially with any other set in C.
Definition 3.9. Let F be a family of subsets of a finite set
One can check that if F satisfies A1-A5 and E is a subfamily of F, then E satisfies A1-A5 as well. Note that we require E ∈ F (rather than just E ⊆ F ), and hence E ∈ E.
Let F be a family of subsets of F that satisfies A1-A5 and let E be a proper subfamily of F that is supported on E ⊂ F . Then no set Y ∈ F intersects E non-trivially, and hence E can be "collapsed". That is, we can obtain a new set family B from F by picking some alternative b / ∈ F , removing all sets X ∈ E \ {E} from F, and replacing each set Y that contains E with (Y \ E) ∪ {b}. It is not hard to check that B satisfies A1-A5. We will write F(E → b) to denote the set family obtained by collapsing a subfamily E of F. That is, we have B = F(E → b) if and only if F = B(b → E).
We will say that a subset family is irreducible if it has no proper subfamilies. THEOREM 3.10. Any irreducible family of subsets satisfying A1-A5 is either a string of sausages or a fat sausage.
Thus, any irreducible set family that satisfies A1-A5 is a clone structure. This provides the basis for our inductive argument. For the inductive step, we need to show that if C and D are two clone structures over disjoint sets C and D, and c is some candidate in C, then C(c → D) is a clone structure. The proof of this fact is somewhat more complicated than one might expect. Indeed, suppose that we have a pair of profiles R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ) and Q = (Q 1 , . . . , Q n ) over sets C and D, respectively, such that C = C(R) and D = C(Q). One might think that, given c ∈ C, we can obtain a preference profile R such that C(c → D) = C(R ) simply by substituting Q i for c in R i , for i = 1, . . . , n. This intuition is not entirely correct: without additional precautions, we may introduce "parasite" clones, i.e., clones that cross the boundary between C and D. However, we can construct an n-voter profile R from R and Q by tweaking this construction slightly. PROPOSITION 3.11 . Let C and D be two clone structures over sets C and D, respectively, where |C| = m, |D| = k, and C ∩ D = ∅. Then for each c ∈ C, the family of subsets C(c → D) is a clone structure.
PROOF. Fix a candidate c ∈ C, and let R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ) and Q = (Q 1 , . . . , Q n ) be two profiles of voters such that C = C(R) and D = C(Q). Since duplicating linear orders in R and Q does not change C and D, we can assume without loss of generality that n = n ≥ 2. Our goal is to construct a profile R such that C(c → D) = C(R ). This profile will have n voters and m + k − 1 alternatives, that is, R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ). We will construct R in two steps. First, for each i = 1, . . . , n, we set R 0 i to be identical to R i except that the occurrence of c is replaced by Q i ; denote the resulting profile by
Otherwise, we flip Q n . That is, assuming without loss of generality that Q n ranks the elements of D as Q n :
where we assume that R n orders the elements of C 1 and C 2 in the same way as R n does; we also set R i = R 0 i for i = 1, . . . , n − 1. Consider the resulting profile R , and let C = C(R ). We claim that C = C(c → D). As above, it is easy to see that C(c → D) ⊆ C . It remains to show that C ⊆ C(c → D).
Let X be a "parasite" clone in C 0 \ C(c → D). Clearly, it cannot be the case that
. Thus, the sets C X = X ∩ C and D X = X ∩ D are both non-empty, and D X = D. Without loss of generality we may assume that each order in R 0 is of the
Now, suppose for the sake of contradiction that Y is a clone in C \ C(c → D). By the same argument as in the previous paragraph, we conclude that Y ∩ D = ∅, Y ∩ C = ∅, and D ⊆ Y . Thus, we have two possibilities:
However, in R n the element d k separates Y and C X , a contradiction.
However, in R 1 the element d 1 separates Y and C X , a contradiction.
Hence, we have Y ∈ C(c → D). The proof is complete.
Using Proposition 3.11 inductively, we can extend Theorem 3.10 to a complete axiomatic characterization of clone structures. Based on Theorem 3.12, it is easy to test in polynomial time (and, in fact, even in logarithmic space) if a given set family (represented explicitly as a list of subsets) is a clone structure: one simply needs to check if all the axioms hold. We state this result more formally in the full version of the paper.
COMPACT REPRESENTATIONS OF CLONE STRUCTURES
Let us now consider the issue of representing clone structures. We say that a clone structure C is k-implementable if there is a k-voter profile R such that C = C(R). One might expect that to obtain a complex clone structure we need an election with many voters. Yet, each clone structure can be implemented by a profile with at most three voters.
THEOREM 4.1. Every clone structure is 3-implementable.
The main idea of the proof is to show that every irreducible clone structure is 3implementable and then to inductively apply the construction from Proposition 3.11.
Nonetheless, we would like a more structured representation. In the previous section we have seen that clone structures are organized hierarchically and, thus, it is natural to represent them using trees. The specific type of trees that are most convenient for this task are PQ-trees introduced by Booth and Lueker [1976] . This representation will prove very useful in Section 5.
A PQ-tree T over a set A = {a 1 , . . . , a n } is an ordered tree that represents a family of permutations over A as follows. The leaves of the tree correspond to the elements of A. Each internal node is either of type P or of type Q. A frontier of T is a permutation of A obtained by reading the leaves of T from left to right (recall that T is ordered). The following operations are allowed on the tree: If a node is of type P, then its children can be permuted arbitrarily. If a node is of type Q, then the order of its children can be reversed. A given permutation π of A is consistent with a PQ-tree T , if we can obtain π as the frontier of T by applying the above operations.
We now describe a natural way to represent clone structures as PQ-trees. Our characterization of irreducible clone structures implies that for any close structure C it holds that any two proper irreducible subfamilies of C have non-intersecting supports. Proposition 4.2 implies that every element of C belongs to at most one proper irreducible subfamily of C. Thus, given a clone structure C ⊆ 2 C , there is a unique maximal collection of pairwise disjoint sets Dec(C) = {C 1 , . . . , C k } such that C i ⊆ C, |C i | ≥ 2, and for each i = 1, . . . , k the set family C i = {C ∈ C | C ⊆ C i } is an irreducible subfamily of C (if C is itself irreducible, then k = 1 and C 1 = C). This collection can be efficiently constructed by identifying the minimal (with respect to inclusion) non-singleton sets in C: any such set of size s ≥ 3 is itself an irreducible clone structure (a fat sausage), and for a set of size s = 2 we need to find the maximal string of sausages that contains it. Note that it need not be the case that k i=1 C i = C; some elements may not belong to any proper irreducible clone structure (consider, for instance, the clone structure over {a, b, c, d} given by {{a}, {b}, {c}, {d}, {b, c}, {a, b, c, d}}) . We will refer to the collection Dec(C) as the decomposition of C. We can now inductively define the PQ-tree T (C) associated with a clone structure C ⊆ 2 C (for convenience, our PQ-trees will be labeled). Suppose first that C is an irreducible clone structure over the set C = {c 1 , . . . , c m }. Then, by Theorem 3.10, it is either a string of sausages or a fat sausage. In the former case, assume without loss of generality that C is associated with the order c 1
In both cases, we let T (C) to be a tree of depth 1 that has m (ordered) leaves. The i-th leaf is labeled by c i . If C is a string of sausages, the root of the tree is of type Q and is labeled by c 1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ c m ; if C is a fat sausage, the root is of type P and is labeled by c 1 . . . c m . For m = 2 the clone structure C is both a string of sausages and a fat sausage; we treat it as a fat sausage.
We then construct the tree T (C ). This tree has leaves labeled by c 1 , . . . , c k . We replace each such leaf c i by the labeled tree T (C i ) for the irreducible set family C i .
Given the tree T (C), we can reconstruct the clone structure C in an obvious way. To illustrate this discussion, in Figure 3 we give a PQ-tree for the clone structure from Example 3.7. We remark that the descendants of any internal node of T (C) form a clone set. However, the converse is not necessarily true, i.e., there are clone sets that cannot be obtained in this way: if an internal node v is labeled with a string of sausages and has k children, k ≥ 3, the descendants of any consecutive children of v, < k, form a clone set. Indeed, it is not hard to see that any clone set corresponds either to a subtree of T (C) or to a collection of subtrees of T (C) whose roots are consecutive children of the same Q-node.
CLONES IN SINGLE-PEAKED ELECTIONS
It is not unusual for voters to make their decisions based on the candidates' position on a single prominent issue, such as, e.g., the level of taxation. Elections where all voters make their decisions in this way (with respect to the same issue) are known as single-peaked. In such elections, the candidates are ordered with respect to their position on the issue. This ordering is called the societal axis; it can, for example, order the candidates from those supporting the lowest level of taxation to those supporting the highest level of taxation. Each voter v forms her preference order as follows. First, v picks the candidate who is the closest to her ideal point on the societal axis. She then ranks the remaining candidates according to her perceived distance to the ideal point. The perception of distance may differ from one voter to another: some voters may view a large deviation to the right as less significant than a small deviation to the left, while others may hold the opposite view. Thus, the voter will zig-zag through the candidate list, ending her ranking with either the leftmost or the rightmost candidate. For example, if the possible tax rates are 10%, 15%, 20%, and 25%, and an election is single-peaked with respect to the axis 10% > 15% > 20% > 25%, a voter's preference order may be, e.g., 20% 15% 10% 25%, but not 20% > 10% > 15% > 25%. Formally, a single-peaked preference profile is defined as follows.
Definition 5.1. Let R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ) be a profile over a candidate set C, and let > be a linear order over C (the societal axis). We say that an order over C is compatible with > if for all c, d, e ∈ C such that either c > d > e or e > d > c, it holds that c d implies d e. We say that R is single-peaked with respect to > if each preference order in R is compatible with >. A profile R over C is called single-peaked if there exists a linear order over C such that R is single-peaked with respect to >; we say that > witnesses single-peakedness of R.
The literature on single-peaked elections is vast; for examples and intuition we point the reader to the original paper of Black [1958] , which introduced this notion, and, for a more algorithmic perspective, to some recent computational social choice papers [Walsh 2007; Escoffier et al. 2008; Conitzer 2009; Brandt et al. 2010; Faliszewski et al. 2011] .
The notion of single-peakedness is very natural and indeed quite a few real-life elections are (close to) single-peaked. Further, single-peaked elections have many desirable properties, of which perhaps the best-known one is that they admit non-manipulable, non-dictatorial voting rules (e.g., the median voter rule [Black 1958] ). This is a very attractive property, which distinguishes single-peaked elections from those with unrestricted preferences (see [Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975] ).
Unfortunately, if a candidate in a single-peaked election is cloned, the election may lose the single-peakedness property: if many voters find the clones very similar, they are likely to rank them randomly, which may be incompatible with any societal axis. Thus, given an election, we might want to check if it can be made single-peaked by "decloning." Of course, we would like the resulting election to be close to the original one. Thus, we look for a single-peaked election that "collapses" as few clones as possible, i.e., has the maximum number of alternatives among all single-peaked elections that can be obtained from the original one by decloning. The main result of this section is a polynomial time algorithm for this problem. Our secondary goal is to understand which clone structures can arise in single-peaked elections. We give a partial answer to this question by, on one hand, providing an example of a clone structure that cannot be implemented by a single-peaked profile, and, on the other hand, identifying a large family of clone structures that admit such an implementation.
Preliminary Observations. Let R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ) be a preference profile over a candidate set C, and let D be some clone set in C(R). Given a c ∈ C, we write R(D → c) to denote the profile R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ), where each R i ∈ R is obtained from R i by replacing the block of candidates from D with c. We refer to the process of converting R to R(D → c) as decloning D to c in R. Note that we can declone D even if the collection of subsets D = {X ∈ C(R) | X ⊆ D} is not a subfamily of C(R) (this is the only difference between the decloning operation → and the collapsing operation →). Given a preference profile R over a set of candidates C, we define c(R) to be |C|.
Given a profile R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ), we refer to the top-ranked candidate in R i ∈ R as the peak of R i , and denote it by peak(R i ). We write peak(R) to denote the set {peak(R i ) | R i ∈ R}. (Note that if R is single-peaked, this does not imply that |peak(R)| = 1: intuitively, the term "single-peaked" refers to the shape of individual preference orders with respect to a given societal axis.) Theorem 5.2 clarifies the relation between possible societal axes and the set of peaks of a profile.
Given a profile R with |peak(R)| ≥ 2 that is single-peaked with respect to >, we say that p 1 and p 2 are the extreme peaks of R with respect to > if either p 1 > p > p 2 for each p ∈ peak(R) \ {p 1 , p 2 } or p 2 > p > p 1 for each p ∈ peak(R) \ {p 1 , p 2 }. We say that two candidates a, b ∈ C are on the same side of c ∈ C \ {a, b} in > if either (a > c ∧ b > c) or (c > a ∧ c > b). Otherwise, we say that a and b are on the opposite sides of c in >. Given two orders > and > over C, we say that > and > agree on D ⊆ C if for each a, b ∈ D it holds that a > b if and only if a > b.
The single-peakedness of a given preference profile can be witnessed by many different orders; for instance, if R is single-peaked with respect to >, it is also single-peaked with respect to ← − > . However, it turns out that these orders have the same extreme peaks and agree (up to an inversion) on all candidates between these peaks.
THEOREM 5.2. Consider a preference profile R over C with |peak(R)| ≥ 2 that is single-peaked with respect to two orders > and > . Let p 1 and p 2 be the extreme peaks of R with respect to > such that p 1 > p 2 . Then p 1 and p 2 are also the extreme peaks of R with respect to > . Moreover, if p 1 > p 2 , then > and > agree on the set P = {c | p 1 > c > p 2 } ∪ {p 1 , p 2 }.
PROOF. Fix two orders > and > that both witness the single-peakedness of R. Consider two candidates p, q ∈ peak(R), and another candidate c ∈ C. We claim that either p and q are on the same side of c in both > and > , or they are on the opposite sides of c in both > and > . Indeed, suppose that this is not the case. Without loss of generality we assume that p > q > c and p > c > q. Now, consider a preference order R i such that peak(R i ) = p. Since R is single-peaked with respect to >, it must be the case that p i q i c; on the other hand, since R is single-peaked with respect to >, we have p i c i q, a contradiction. Hence, either p and q are on the same side of c in both > and > , or p and q are on the opposite sides of c in both > and > . Now, consider an arbitrary p ∈ peak(R) \ {p 1 , p 2 }. Since p 1 and p 2 are the extreme peaks of R and p 1 > p 2 , we have p 1 > p > p 2 . Therefore, by the argument above we have p 1 > p > p 2 . This proves the first statement of the theorem.
To prove the second statement, assume that p 1 > p 2 . Also, without loss of generality, assume that p 1 = peak(R 1 ) and p 2 = peak(R 2 ). Let P = {c | p 1 > c > p 2 } ∪ {p 1 , p 2 }. Suppose that P \ P = ∅, and consider a candidate c ∈ P \ P . The candidates p 1 and p 2 are on the opposite sides of c in >, but on the same side of c in > , a contradiction. Assuming P \ P = ∅ leads to a contradiction as well. Thus, P = P . Now, suppose that for some c, d ∈ P \{p 1 , p 2 } we have c > d and d > c. Then, since R is single-peaked with respect to >, we have p 1 1 c 1 d. However, since R is single-peaked with respect to > , we have p 1 1 d 1 c, a contradiction. Thus, the theorem is proved.
Theorem 5.2 enables us to speak of extreme peaks of a single-peaked profile, without referring to a specific societal axis.
We are ready to start our investigation of clones in single-peaked profiles. Consider a preference profile R over C that is single-peaked with respect to some order >, and let D be a clone set with respect to R. Do members of D appear consecutively in >? Not necessarily (take two votes, b c a d and c b a d, and axis a > b > c > d; {a, d} is a clone even though a and d are not consecutive in >), but they form at most two blocks within >.
PROPOSITION 5.3. Let R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ) be a preference profile over a candidate set C that is single-peaked with respect to some order >, and let D ∈ C(R) be a clone set for R with |D| ≥ 2. Then C can be partitioned into pairwise disjoint sets A 1 , A 2 , D 1 , D 2 , and P so that C \D = A 1 ∪P ∪A 2 , D = D 1 ∪D 2 , D 1 = ∅, D 2 = ∅, and A 1 > D 1 > P > D 2 > A 2 . Further, if P = ∅, then peak(R) ⊆ P , and, moreover, P i D i A 1 ∪ A 2 for each i = 1, . . . , n.
PROOF. Suppose that our first claim is not true. Then there exist two candidates c 1 , c 2 ∈ C \ D and three candidates d 1 , d 2 , d 3 ∈ D such that d 1 > c 1 > d 2 > c 2 > d 3 . Let p = peak(R 1 ). If p > d 2 or p = d 2 , we have d 2 1 c 2 1 d 3 and hence D is not contiguous in R 1 , a contradiction. Similarly, if d 2 > p, we have d 2 1 c 1 1 d 1 , a contradiction again. This proves our claim regarding the partition of C. To see that we can ensure that both D 1 and D 2 are non-empty, note that if, e.g., D 1 = ∅, we can modify the partition by merging P into A 1 (so that the new P is empty), and repartitioning D into two non-empty sets (recall that |D| ≥ 2).
To prove the second claim, consider an arbitrary preference profile R i . Since P = ∅, the peak of R i must be in P , as otherwise it would be impossible for R i to rank members of D contiguously. Now, let us show that P i D. Suppose that this is not the case, i.e., d i p for some d ∈ D, p ∈ P . Since both D 1 and D 2 are non-empty, we can pick two alternatives d 1 ∈ D 1 , d 2 ∈ D 2 . As R i ranks members of D contiguously, it has to be the case that D i p, and, in particular, {d 1 , d 2 } i p. But we have d 1 > p > d 2 , so d 1 i p implies p i d 2 , a contradiction. Thus P i D.
Finally, let us show that D i A 1 ∪ A 2 . Since the peak of R i is in P , A 1 > D 1 implies D 1 i A 1 , and D 2 > A 2 implies D 2 i A 2 . Suppose for the sake of contradiction that a i d for some a ∈ A, d ∈ D. Then either a ∈ A 1 , d ∈ D 2 (and hence D 1 i a i d) or a ∈ A 2 , d ∈ D 1 (and hence D 2 i a i d). In both cases, we obtain a contradiction with D being contiguous in R i . Thus, D i A 1 ∪ A 2 . This completes the proof. Proposition 5.3 motivates a very useful classification of clone sets in single-peaked profiles. Let R be a profile over some candidate set C that is single-peaked with respect to some order >. If the elements of D are ranked contiguously in >, then we say that D is a clone set of the first type with respect to >; otherwise, we say that D is a clone set of the second type with respect to >. The following is an immediate corollary of the second part of Proposition 5.3.
COROLLARY 5.4. Let R be a single-peaked preference profile. If D ∈ C(R) is a clone set of the second type w.r.t. some societal axis >, then D does not contain any peaks of R.
Observe that if D is a clone set of the first type that does not contain any peaks of R, then for each voter i either peak(R i ) i D, in which case i coincides with > on D, or D i peak(R i ), in which case i coincides with ← − > on D. Thus, the following corollary.
COROLLARY 5.5. Let R be a single-peaked preference profile over a candidate set C. If D ∈ C(R) is a clone set of the first type with respect to some societal axis >, |D| ≥ 2, and D ∩ peak(R) = ∅, then D = {D ∈ C | D ⊆ D} is a string of sausages.
Decloning Towards a Single-Peaked Profile. We will now present an algorithm for transforming a given election into a single-peaked one by decloning. Our algorithm works with a PQ-tree T that captures the clone structure of our profile. Informally, it first contracts the tree to a single node, and then greedily reintroduces clone sets, following the branches of the tree, while maintaining the invariant that the resulting profile is single-peaked (this requires care as single-peakedness of a profile can be witnessed by many different societal axes). In what follows, we present a version of our algorithm that only declones clone sets that correspond to subtrees of T . This algorithm produces the optimal decloning for many settings (and, in particular, for all profiles whose PQ-trees contain P-nodes only), but may fail to find an optimal solution in some cases. We will show an example of such a case and outline a more sophisticated polynomial-time algorithm that works for all profiles. We describe our algorithm in terms of proper colorings of a PQ-tree. Definition 5.7. Let R be a profile over a candidate set C, set T = T (C(R)), and let f be a proper coloring of T . For a node v ∈ T , let C v = {c ∈ C | c is a leaf of T 's subtree rooted in v}. Define R(T, f ) to be the profile obtained from R as follows: for each internal node v, if v is black and its parent is white (or v is the root), declone the set C v to a single candidate v.
Our algorithm BASICDECLONESP takes as an input a preference profile R. It then constructs a PQ-tree T = T (C(R)) that corresponds to the clone structure of R. It initializes f to be a coloring of T in which every node is black; this coloring will be modified during the execution of the algorithm. Note that at this point R(T, f ) is singlepeaked and c(R(T, f )) = 1 (recall that for a profile R, c(R) denotes the number of candidates in R). The algorithm also maintains a queue of nodes that it intends to visit. Initially, the queue contains the root of T only. Throughout the execution, we ensure that R(T, f ) is single-peaked and all ancestors of each node in the queue are white; note that this is indeed the case just after the initialization stage.
At each stage, BASICDECLONESP(R) picks a node v from the queue (if the queue is empty, the algorithm terminates). It then executes the following steps:
By induction on the execution of the algorithm, one can see that at each point in time f is a proper coloring of T , and therefore R(T, f ) is well-defined. Further, each node is processed at most once, so BASICDECLONESP(R) runs in polynomial time. Finally, it is clear that BASICDECLONESP(R) produces a single-peaked election.
We now show that given a profile R over a candidate set C, BASICDECLONESP outputs a single-peaked profile R with the following property: c(R ) ≤ c(R ) for any single-peaked preference profile R that can be obtained from R by decloning clone sets that correspond to subtrees of T (C(R)). First, as a sanity check, we note that if a profile is already single-peaked then it remains single-peaked after decloning.
PROPOSITION 5.8. Let R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ) be a single-peaked preference profile over a candidate set C, and let D ∈ C(R) be a clone set such that |D| ≥ 2. Let c be some candidate not in C. Then the preference profile R = R(D → c) is single-peaked.
PROOF. Suppose that R is single-peaked with respect to some order > over C. We will now construct an order > over (C \ D) ∪ {c} such that R is single-peaked with respect to > . By Proposition 5.3, we know that C can be partitioned into P ,
If P = ∅, we set > to be an order that agrees with > on A 1 ∪ A 2 and satisfies A 1 > c > A 2 . If P = ∅, we set > to be an order that agrees with > on A 1 ∪ P ∪ A 2 and satisfies A 1 > c > P > A 2 . In both cases, it is immediate that R is single-peaked with respect to > .
Our next result shows that non-overlapping clones can be reintroduced independently. To prove this, we need to show a converse of Proposition 5.8, namely, that if we start with a single-peaked preference profile, and declone some clone set to obtain a new (single-peaked) preference profile, then any societal axis that witnesses the single-peakedness of the latter can be modified to witness the single-peakedness of the former. This is crucial for our algorithm, as it needs to maintain control over the societal axis while reintroducing clones. PROPOSITION 5.9. Let R be a preference profile over a set of candidates C. Let D 1 , . . . , D k ∈ C(R) be a sequence of pairwise disjoint clone sets, and let c 1 , . . . , c k be a sequence of distinct candidates not in C. For each i = 1, . . . , k, let R i denote a preference profile in which for each j = 1, . . . , k, j = i, D j is decloned to c j . Then R is single-peaked if and only if each of the profiles R i , i = 1, . . . , k, is single-peaked.
PROOF. The "only if" direction follows from Proposition 5.8. For the "if " direction, we will give a proof for the case k = 2; the general case follows by induction.
, and let D = D 1 , c = c 1 . By Proposition 5.8, R is single-peaked; let > be some order that witnesses this. The general idea of our proof is as follows: We will first show that there are orders > 1 and > 2 , both very similar to > , witnessing single-peakedness of R 1 and R 2 , respectively. We will then show that the "edits" needed to turn > into > 1 and the "edits" needed to turn > into > 2 are independent and thus we can turn > into an order witnessing single-peakedness of R.
We will now construct an order > 1 that witnesses the single-peakedness of R 1 . We start with an arbitrary preference order > that witnesses the single-peakedness of R 1 . This order may not have the properties that we are interested in; therefore, we will construct > 1 by taking a "hybrid" of > and > . We will consider two cases.
D is a clone set of the first type with respect to >. We claim that in this case we can construct > 1 from > by replacing c with the members of D, ranked either according to > or according to ← − > . Indeed, let p 1 and p 2 be the extreme peaks of R such that p 1 > p 2 , and let B = {b | p 1 > b > p 2 }. If |peak(R )| = 1, set p 1 = p 2 to be the unique member of peak(R ) and let B = {p 1 }. Let > c be the order obtained from > by replacing the occurrence of D with c; if p 2 > c p 1 , reverse > c . The proof of Proposition 5.8 shows that R is single-peaked with respect to > c . Thus, by Theorem 5.2, > c and > agree on B and rank the members of B consecutively. Suppose first that c > c B. If c > B then we obtain > 1 from > by replacing the occurrence of c with the members of D, ranked in the order of >. If B > c, we replace the occurrence of c with the members of D, ranked in the order of ← − > . It is easy to see that R 1 is single-peaked with respect to > 1 . The case B > c c can be handled similarly. Finally, suppose that c ∈ B. Since > and > c agree on B and rank members of B consecutively, it suffices again to replace the occurrence of c with the members of D, ranked in the order of >. Clearly, R 1 is single-peaked with respect to the resulting order > 1 . D is a clone set of the second type with respect to >. By Proposition 5.3, there is a (unique) partition of C into sets A 1 , A 2 , D 1 , D 2 , P such that P = ∅,
Thus, both P and P ∪ {c} are clone sets for R . Moreover, P ∩ peak(R ) = ∅, so by Corollary 5.4 P is a clone set of the first type with respect to > . Thus, we have either A 1 > c > P > A 2 or A 1 > P > c > A 2 for some A 1 , A 2 such that A 1 ∪ A 2 = A; assume without loss of generality that A 1 > c > P > A 2 . Consider the order > 1 given by A 1 > 1 D 1 > 1 P > 1 D 2 > 1 A 2 , which agrees with > on C \ D and agrees with > on D. Clearly, R 1 is single-peaked with respect to > 1 .
In both cases, we derive an order > 1 that witnesses the single-peakedness of R 1 from > by either replacing the occurrence of c with the members of D (if D is a clone set of the first type), or replacing c with some members of D and inserting the remaining members of D into a clearly specified position in > . Now, recall that R 1 (D 1 → c 1 ) = R 2 (D 2 → c 2 ), and therefore > also witnesses the single-peakedness of R 2 (D 2 → c 2 ). Hence, we can derive an order > 2 that witnesses the single-peakedness of R 2 from > in a similar manner. Crucially, the "edits" required to obtain > 1 from > are independent of the edits required to obtain > 2 from > . Consequently, if we apply these edits jointly to obtain a new order > * , this order witnesses that R is single-peaked, which is exactly what we need to prove.
In the next theorem we show correctness of BASICDECLONESP for the case of decloning subtrees only, and in the following proposition we show that sometimes decloning subtrees does not suffice.
THEOREM 5.10. Given an n-voter preference profile R over a candidate set C, BASICDECLONESP(R) runs in time polynomial in n and |C|, and produces a singlepeaked preference profile R such that c(R ) ≥ c(R ) for any single-peaked preference profile R that can be obtained from R by decloning one or more clone sets that correspond to subtrees of T (C(R)).
PROOF. We have already argued that BASICDECLONESP(R) runs in polynomial time and produces a single-peaked preference profile. Now, consider the tree T = T (C(R)). Clearly, any preference profile that can be obtained from R by decloning clone sets that correspond to subtrees of T is associated with a proper coloring of T . We define a partial order on the colorings of T as follows: if f and g are two colorings of T , then f g if W (g) ⊆ W (f ). Observe that if f g, then c(R(T, f )) ≥ c(R (T, g) ).
Let f ∪g be the coloring that satisfies W (f ∪g) = W (f )∪W (g). It is not hard to see that if f and g are proper colorings of T , then so is f ∪ g. Moreover, Proposition 5.9 implies that if R(T, f ) and R(T, g) are single-peaked, then so is R(T, f ∪ g). Thus, the set of all proper colorings that correspond to single-peaked profiles is an upper semi-lattice, where the join operation is given by ∪. Thus, this set has a unique maximal element f * . It is not hard to see that BASICDECLONESP(R) outputs the profile R(T, f * ). Since f * f for any proper coloring f , we have c(R(T, f * )) ≥ c(R(T, f )).
PROPOSITION 5.11. Let C be a string of sausages over candidates {a, b, c}, let D be a string of sausages over candidates {1, 2, 3}, and let D be a fat sausage over candidates {x, y}. Then the clone structure C = C(b → D ) is not single-peaked, but the clone
PROOF. To prove the first statement, let R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ) be a profile that implements C . For the sake of contradiction, suppose that R is single-peaked with respect to a societal axis >. Since C and D are strings of sausages, each order in R is of one of the following four types: (1) a 1 2 3 c, (2) a 3 2 1 c, (3) c 1 2 3 a, and (4) c 3 2 1 a.
If R only contains orders of the first and the fourth type, then {a, 1} is a clone in R. If R only contains orders of the second and the third type, then {a, 3} is a clone in R. So R must contain both an order where a is adjacent to 1 and an order where a is adjacent to 3.
If R contains orders of the first and the second type, both 1 and 3 must be adjacent to a in >, and 2 must be adjacent to either 1 or 3. However, if 2 is adjacent to 1 in >, the order of the second type is incompatible with >, and if 2 is adjacent to 3 in >, the order of the first type is incompatible with >.
Next, suppose that R contains orders of the first and the third type. Since both a and c are ranked last by some voters, it must be the case that a and c are extreme points of >. Now, if a > {1, 2, 3} > c, the presence of the ranking a 1 2 3 c implies that a > 1 > 2 > 3 > c, and hence no voter can rank the candidates as c 1 2 3 a, a contradiction. If c > {1, 2, 3} > a, we obtain a contradiction as well.
Remaining cases are symmetric to the above ones; we conclude that R cannot be single-peaked. On the other hand, C is implemented by a profile with two preference orders, a x y c and a y x c, which are single-peaked with respect to x > a > y > c.
In Proposition 5.11 the clone structure C can be obtained from C by decloning the clone {1, 2} to x (and renaming 3 as y). Further, C has four candidates, whereas any clone structure that can be obtained from C by decloning clone sets that correspond to substructures of C will have at most three candidates. This shows that if T (C(R)) contains Q-nodes, BASICDECLONESP(R) may fail to find the optimal decloning of a given profile into a single-peaked one (however, if T (C(R)) contains P-nodes only, then BASICDECLONESP(R) actually finds an optimal solution).
Hence, to obtain an algorithm that always finds an optimal decloning, we need to modify BASICDECLONESP(R) to also consider clone sets that correspond to substrings of strings of sausages. However, a straightforward implementation of this idea leads to an exponential blow-up in the running time: there are exponentially many ways to choose a non-overlapping collection of substrings of a given string. Fortunately, it turns out that it suffices to consider breaking strings of sausages into two parts. In the full version of the paper we present a polynomial-time algorithm that makes use of this idea and always finds an optimal single-peaked decloning of a given preference profile; this algorithm differs from BASICDECLONESP(R) in its handling of Q-nodes only.
Clone Structures via Single-Peaked Profiles.
Let us now turn to our second goal, the problem of characterizing clone structures that can be implemented using singlepeaked profiles. Formally, we say that a clone structure C is single-peaked if there exists a single-peaked profile R such that C = C(R). The following proposition states that all irreducible clone structures are single-peaked.
PROPOSITION 5.12. Fat sausages and strings of sausages are single-peaked.
Thus, by Proposition 5.11, single-peaked clone structures are not closed under embeddings. Nonetheless, we identify a large class of single-peaked clone structures.
PROPOSITION 5.13. Let C be a clone structure over a set of candidates C. Suppose that for each Q-node of the PQ-tree decomposition T (C) of C it holds that all children, except possibly the leftmost child and the rightmost child, are labeled with singletons, i.e., elements of C. Then C is a single-peaked clone structure.
For example, Proposition 5.13 implies that every clone structure that can be constructed by starting with a single candidate and embedding a series of fat sausages in an arbitrary way is single-peaked. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.13. Let T = T (C) be some PQ-tree decomposition of C. We first describe a societal axis >, and then construct a profile R that is single-peaked with respect to > and satisfies C(R) = C.
We obtain > as follows. For every pair of candidates c , c ∈ C, we set c > c if in the DFS traversal of T , the node representing c is visited before the node representing c . Note that T is an ordered tree and thus the order of the DFS traversal is uniquely determined; intuitively, this is simply the left-to-right order of leaves of T .
To describe the profile R, we need some additional notation. As in Definition 5.7, for every node v ∈ T , we set C v = {c ∈ C | c is a leaf of T 's subtree rooted in v}, and let D v = C \ C v . For every node v ∈ T , we will introduce several preference orders that rank the candidates in C v ahead of those in D v . This will ensure that the part of C that corresponds to v is implemented correctly. Since each preference order in R has to rank all candidates, we will define for each v ∈ T an order v on D v that will be used for ranking the candidates in D v in the preference profiles that correspond to v.
The order v is defined as follows. Let P = (v 1 , . . . , v k ) be the (unique) path from v to the root, where v = v 1 , v k is the root, and for each i = 1, . . . , k − 1 the node v i+1 is the parent of v i . Let c, c be two candidates in D v . Let v i be the first node of P that lies on the path from c to the root. Similarly, let v j be the first node of P that lies on the path from c to the root. Then v orders c and c as follows: Let be some preference order over C v that is single-peaked with respect to >. The reader can verify that any preference order that ranks C v above D v , agrees with on C v , and agrees with v on D v is single-peaked with respect to >. Further, for each clone D ∈ C such that either C v ⊆ D or C v ∩ D = ∅ it holds that the members of D are ranked consecutively in v . (The last claim uses the fact that for any Q-node only its leftmost and rightmost child can be non-singletons.)
We can now describe the profile R. For each node v we construct several preference orders as follows.
Let v be a P-node with children v 1 , . . . , v k . For each i = 1, . . . , k, we add four preference orders, which we will denote by R 1 vi , R 2 vi , R 3 vi , and R 4 vi . Each of them ranks C v above D v and agrees with v on D v . It remains to describe how they order the members of C v . Set A = C v1 ∪ · · · ∪ C vi−1 , B = C vi+1 ∪ · · · ∪ C v k . We have (see the description below for clarification):
For each occurrence of A and B in the above preference orders, we order members of A and B by following either > or ← − > , whichever way is required to ensure singlepeakedness. Each occurrence of C vi corresponds to ranking the members of C vi according to >, and each occurrence of ←− C vi corresponds to ranking the members of C vi according to ← − > . The preference orders R j vi , j = 1, . . . , 4, ensure that any clone in R that contains both a member of C vi and a member of C v \ C vi has to contain all of C v . Further, for each clone D ∈ C, the members of D are ranked consecutively in each R j vi , j = 1, . . . , 4. Now, let v be a Q-node in T with children v 1 , . . . , v k ; note that k ≥ 3, since in our construction of PQ-trees all nodes with 2 children are labeled as P-nodes. Then we introduce voters
defined in the same way as for a P-node. This completes the description of R.
Clearly, each set in C is a clone in the preference profile R. Conversely, no set D ∈ 2 C \ C is a clone in R. Indeed, fix a subset D ∈ 2 C \ C, let c be the minimal element of D with respect to >, and let c be the maximal element of D with respect to >. Now consider the path v 1 , . . . , v t from c to c in T . By construction of R we have t i=1 C vi ⊆ D. However, by the choice of c and c we have D = t i=1 C vi ∈ C, which is a contradiction.
Proposition 5.11 shows that Proposition 5.13 does not characterize single-peaked clone structures; finding such a characterization is an open problem.
CLONES IN SINGLE-CROSSING ELECTIONS
Let us now consider a different domain restriction called single-crossing. The idea behind single-crossing elections is similar to that behind single-peaked elections, but now it is the voters who are ordered along some axis; say, the traditional left-to-right spectrum of political views. Consider a voter v on one of the extreme ends of the spectrum and two candidates, c and d such that v prefers c to d. As we move toward the other end of the voter spectrum, for a while voters agree that c is better than d, but eventually d crosses c and, from this point on, the voters prefer d to c. Single-crossing dates back at least to Mirrlees [1971] ; see also [Gans and Smart 1996; Saporiti and Tohmé 2006; Barberá and Moreno 2011] for more recent work that also describes realistic settings where single-crossing profiles arise. Formally, we use the following definition. Definition 6.1. We say that a preference profile R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ) over candidate set C is single-crossing with respect to order ¡ over [n] if for every pair of distinct candidates c, d ∈ C it holds that either {i | c i d} ¡ {j | d j c} or {i | d i c} ¡ {j | c j d}. We say that a profile is single-crossing if there exists an order ¡ with respect to which it is single-crossing.
Strictly speaking, the notion introduced in Definition 6.1 is referred to as order restriction and not single-crossing. However, in our setting these two notions are equivalent and the term "single-crossing" is much more intuitive.
We note that checking if a profile is single-crossing requires only polynomial time; to the best of our knowledge, this observation does not appear in the literature. PROPOSITION 6.2. Checking if a given profile is single-crossing is in P.
PROOF. Suppose that we are given a preference profile R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ) over a set of candidates C = {c 1 , . . . , c m }. For each i = 1, . . . , n, we will check if there exists an order ¡ over [n] in which voter i appears first; we return "yes" if the answer is positive for some i.
Without loss of generality, we can focus on the case i = 1 and assume that voter 1 ranks the candidates as c 1 1 . . . 1 c m . Now, consider a directed graph G with a vertex set [n] that has an edge from j to k if there exists a pair of candidates (c x , c y ) with x < y such that c x j c y , but c y k c x . Clearly, for every pair of nodes (j, k) at least one of the edges (j, k) and (k, j) is present in this graph. The single-crossing condition immediately implies that if there is an edge from j to k, then j precedes k in ¡. Therefore, if G has a cycle, R is not single-crossing with respect to any ordering of voters in which voter 1 appears first. On the other hand, if G is acyclic, it induces a total order over [n], and it is immediate that R is single-crossing with respect to this order.
As in the case of single-peakedness, we would like to know which clone structures can be implemented by single-crossing profiles and what is the complexity of decloning towards a single-crossing profile. Our answers are opposite to those for the case of single-peakedness. THEOREM 6.3. For every clone structure C there exists a single-crossing profile R such that C = C(R).
We remark that, unlike the construction in the proof of Proposition 3.11, which leads to a 3-voter profile (Theorem 4.1), the proof of Theorem 6.3 produces a profile with many voters. THEOREM 6.4. Given a profile R over a candidate set C and a positive integer k, it is NP-hard to decide if there exists a single-crossing profile R over a candidate set C , |C | ≥ k, that can be obtained from R by decloning.
However, optimal decloning is easy if the order of voters is fixed. PROPOSITION 6.5. Given a profile R over a candidate set C, a positive integer k, and an order ¡, we can decide in polynomial time if there exists a profile R with c(R ) ≥ k that is single-crossing with respect to ¡ and can be obtained from R by decloning.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have characterized clone structures in elections, obtained a convenient representation that is based on PQ-trees, and used this representation in an algorithm that restores an election's single-peakedness by decloning as few candidates as possible. On the other hand, we have shown that recovering the single-crossing property optimally is NP-hard. We also made first steps toward characterizing clone structures in singlepeaked elections and we have shown that all clone structures can be implemented with single-crossing profiles.
Future research directions include establishing the complexity of verifying whether a given candidate can be made an election winner (under a particular voting rule) by decloning a given number of candidates (preliminary results on this topic can be found in the conference version of [Elkind et al. 2011] ). Further, we believe that it is important to investigate noisy, or approximate, clone structures, i.e., to relax the requirement that all voters rank members of a given clone set consecutively.
